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THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF PRORATIONING, THE
DEPLETION ALLOWANCE AND IMPORT QUOTAS
ON THE COST OF PRODUCING CRUDE OIL IN THE
UNITED STATES*
ALFRED E. KAHNt

I have been studying the U.S. petroleum industry on and off for
the last twenty years. Except during the very first few years of this
period-just after the price of crude oil jumped from about $1.20
to about $2.60 a barrel, in 1946 and 1947-the industry has complained persistently that the price of oil was too low, and that such
price increases as it had been able to obtain were being wiped out by
a constant increase in finding and production costs. Since 1957 it has
been able to point also to declining exploratory and developmental
drilling and more recently to a declining ratio of proved reserves
to production as evidence of this cost-price squeeze. You will recognize that complaints such as these are now being used to justify the
price increases just put into effect during this past month. Industry
spokesmen have been asking not just for price increases, but also
for tighter controls on imports and even increases in the percentage
depletion allowance-I have seen serious suggestions that it ought
to be raised to 33% from the present 27y %-all in order to
remedy the cost-price squeeze and to induce a greater exploratory
effort.
The purpose of my testimony is to try to show that these apparently unfavorable developments of the last several years have
been not chance misfortunes that have befallen this industry, but
the inevitable consequences of its own economics, on the one hand,
and of the complex system of governmental controls and preferential income tax arrangements under which it operates, on the other;
that if we were so foolish as to let the price of oil rise, or to do the
other things the domestic producers ask, in order to encourage or
help them, the same processes would inevitably reassert themselves:
costs would again rise; efforts to breach or circumvent the import
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government intervention in the market mechanism as it affects the petroleum industry.
The hearings are available on request from the Subcommittee.
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controls would intensify; drilling would once again fall off; the
industry would be right back where it is today; but the American
public would be worse off.
Let me put the economic principles that I propose to enunciate
just as baldly and clearly as I can. What I am saying is that in this
industry: (1) costs are as high as they are because of the depletion
allowance and the other advantages the industry enjoys under the
federal income tax laws, because of the controls we have imposed
on production and imports and because price is as high as it is; (2)
if, then, we were to raise price even farther, increase percentage
depletion, tighten the screws on imports even more, then costs would
rise even more.
Perhaps the clearest way of supporting these propositions would
be to make a quick survey of the industry's history during the last
twenty years, to show how these processes have in fact operated
in the past.
The first postwar decade was dominated by the following combination of interrelated factors: (1) general inflation, which involved both a sharp increase in the demand for oil and a general
belief that oil in the ground was an excellent hedge against the
declining purchasing power of the dollar; (2) the steep price increases of 1946-47, attributable to the sharp postwar increases in
demand and the much slower adaptation of supply, exploration and
development which was seriously retarded by the shortages of the
war years; (3) the enormously increased contribution of the federal
income tax laws to the incentive to explore for and develop oil
supplies.
The last may need a word of explanation. The strength of the
incentive provided by the depletion allowance, the privilege of expensing intangible well-drilling costs, and by the difference between
the tax treatment of capital gains and ordinary income depends on
how high the normal income tax rates are. So the rise in the corporation tax rate from 19% in 1939 to 52% after the war (with excess
profits tax rates even higher) made these arrangements far more
attractive than they had been before. Similarly, when the highest
individual income surtax rate was up at 91 %, it meant that when
anyone in that bracket spent a dollar to drill a dry hole it cost him
only 9 ; the government paid the other 91 €.
The result of these circumstances was an enormous increase in
well-drilling activity; total exploratory wells drilled rose from 5,600
in 1945 to 10,000 in 1950 and 16,200 in 1956. The drilling of
developmental wells increased from 19,000 to 41,000 over the
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same eleven-year span. The consequence was, of course, a sharp
increase in production capacity.
It was clear from a fairly early point, as we will shortly see,
that the expansion of capacity was outpacing the growth in demand.
Why then did it continue? There were two main reasons: the
enormously increased value of the tax allowances, and the system
of state-enforced production control known as prorationing to
market demand. In 1948 the State of Texas permitted those of its
wells that were subject to production control to produce at their
prescribed quotas for the entire 366 days in the year; in 1949, with
a mild recession in the economy at large, Texas allowables were
reduced to 278 days-or about 25% 1 Days of permitted production were cut again in 1950, to 230; increased to 261 in 1952,
during the Korean war, but during the mild recession year of 1954
they were cut to only 194 days; by 1958, the first full year after
the reopening of the Suez canal, they were down to 122, and in
1962, the low point, production was permitted only 97 days in the
entire year.
These sharp production cutbacks insulated the market price from
the consequences of the increasing surplus capacity-almost completely until 1958, with a high degree of success to this very day.
In a free market, the price would soon have begun to fall, to whatever extent necessary to stop the excessive inflow of capital. Here,
instead, in the face of almost continuously growing excess capacity,
price was actually increased, once in mid-1953, again in January
1957-raised by leading producer-buyers at times of temporary
increases in demand, then held at the higher level (although widespread erosion did occur after 1957) by sharp cutbacks of allowable
production when demand fell off.
We should note in passing that the system of state production
controls thus serves to permit the leading producers of crude oil to
fix their own prices and make them stick. The typical pattern is for
buying prices to be posted in each field by the leading purchaserwho happens typically to be the largest producer as well. When,
taking into account what the market will bear, trends in cost and the
like, such a buyer posts an increase and other leading producerbuyers elsewhere decide to follow, it is they that raise the price
but it is the state regulatory agency that enforces the increase by
putting into effect whatever restraints on production prove to be
necessary for the purpose.
Not surprisingly, the lead is usually taken by the major companies which produce the greater proportion of their own crude oil
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requirements. Amusingly, The Wall Street Journal's story characterizes the company that led the latest increase, Texaco, as "the
nation's leading marketer of gasoline and one of the nation's largest buyers of crude oil." It might have been somewhat more relevant to have pointed out that Texaco was in 1967 the nation's second largest producer of crude oil as well.
Melvin deChazeau and I showed many years ago (in our Integration and Competition in the Petroleum Industry p. 222) that,
under simplified but not unreasonable assumptions, the advantages
under the tax laws of earning one's profits in crude oil production
rather than in refining are such that a company would be better off
with a raised price of crude oil, even though product prices were
absolutely unchanged, so long as it produced over 77 % of its requirements. That is, even though it had to buy up to 23 % of its
crude oil needs at the higher price, while its selling prices were absolutely unchanged, it would be better off, the greater losses in its
refining operation being outweighed by the lesser gains-lesser before tax but greater after tax-in its production operations. I think
a more realistic estimate of this point of indifference would be 80 %,
under the present corporation income tax. But of course no one expects product prices to remain absolutely unchanged in the face of
whatever increase in the crude oil price finally emerges. If product
prices go up by one-half as much as the crude oil price, any refiner
will be better off so long as it produces more than 40 % of its needs.
In light of these considerations, it is of interest to look at the
1967 crude oil self-sufficiency ratios of the first five companies to
raise their crude oil buying price, according to the first eight days of
stories in The Wall Street Journal (the ratios are of their net U.S.
and Canadian production of crude oil and natural gas liquids to
their U.S. and Canada refinery requirements and are taken from
the First National City Bank's January 1969 Energy Memo):
Texaco (slightly over 80%), Kerr-McGee (63%),
Gulf
(73 Y2 ), Continental (93%), and Humble (71Y %). And here
is the list, also in chronological order and from the same source,
of refiners that followed Texaco in raising the price of gasoline but
not in posting higher prices of crude oil, with their corresponding
self-sufficiency ratios: Phillips (S6Y 2 %), American Oil (58%the ratio for its parent, Standard of Indiana), Sinclair (40I % ),
Sunray DX (54%). No wonder that the Journal reported many
small refiners, who buy most of their crude, as being "very upset"
about the price rise, and Sinclair as explaining its refusal to follow
on the ground that refining and marketing margins had been de-
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pressed in recent years, and stating that it would raise its crude oil
price only when satisfied that the gasoline price increase would
hold.
But this is a diversion from the main story I want to tell-which
has to do with the impact on costs of a crude oil price increase enforced by state-ordered cutbacks in production (and, later, by import quotas).
The cutbacks in allowable production were of course not painless;
far from it. But since the total demand for oil was probably relatively unresponsive to price, the industry was better off with a
higher price and reduced output than it would have been with uncontrolled production and the markedly lower price that this would
have brought about. So this method of adjusting output to demand
encouraged a greater and longer-continued inflow of capital than
would have taken place had price been free to reflect the increasing
imbalance between capacity and consumption.
The interesting thing for us to note is that the price increases of
1953 and 1957 were both "justified" by evidence of rising costs of
finding, developing and producing oil. But-and this is the main
point I want to emphasize-those rising costs were the inevitable
consequence of the tax incentives and production control systems
under which the industry operates. Why so? Clearly, first, the
greater the tax preferences and the higher the price of oil, the
farther it pays explorers to go looking for it in marginal areas,
developing marginal-i.e., high-cost-reservoirs, and producing
from marginal-i.e., high-cost-wells. And the larger bonuses and
royalties it will pay explorers to offer leaseholders for the privilege
of looking for oil on their land. All of these mean higher costs.
Second, if you hold price far above the cost of efficient producers
and raise after-tax returns on investment in any industry above
those of other industries, then, so long as entry is free, capital will
pour in. And if, when this produces excess capacity, you protect
profits by cutting back production and maintaining price, then
capital will keep coming in. Until what point? Until the cost burden
of excess capacity is just sufficient to eliminate the artificial stimulus
to investment that created it in the first place. Until, that is, profits
are reduced by the low levels of capacity utilization just enough
so that new entrants no longer see the likelihood of earning supernormal profits. The higher the price or the greater the depletion
allowance, the more capital will pour in, and the more excess
capacity investors will tolerate before a new equilibrium is produced. The gradual erosion after 1947, 1953 and 1957 of the
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benefits of the higher price and of the tax laws, caused by the rise
in costs, was not an unhappy accident; it was the inevitable result
of the increased investment that they themselves attracted.
Suppose a price of $2.85 a barrel, maintained by production restrictions, is far above the average cost of production from new
wells. Then obviously, with free entry, new wells will be drilled,
production capacity will increase, and output will have to be cut
back if that price is to be maintained. How long will the process
continue? Until average production cost rises to $2.85 too-as allowable production from each well is cut farther and farther short of its
lowest-cost point. If instead the price were permitted to drop, as it
would in a competitive market, then in the long run investment
and additions to capacity would fall off relative to demand and
the utilization of capacity would increase until the average cost of
production at the margin was reduced to the new, lower price. No
wonder, then, that the industry could point to steadily increasing
costs in apparent justification of the 1953 and 1957 price increases;
or that the price increases in turn brought only temporary relief:
the higher prices caused the higher costs.
Actually, the burden of excess capacity is not shared equally by
all wells and firms in the oil industry. The inequality of sharing
merely further underlines my contention that the system of production controls equates cost to price rather than price to cost. There
are hundreds of thousands of wells in the industry, with widely
divergent production costs. Some young, flush, flowing wells could,
if uncontrolled, account for the preponderant share of national
needs at a price well below the present level-perhaps at $2.00,
perhaps less. Others have costs far above this level; many would
shut down entirely if price fell much below $3.00. When a cartel
faces the necessity for putting quota restrictions on output, it inevitably faces the question of how it is going to distribute the restrictions. I know of no governmentally-enforced cartel, especially
in a democracy, where each man has a vote, that does not feel the
need for keeping everyone or almost everyone in business. What
this means, in almost universal practice, is that the greater burden
of restraint is made to fall on the big, comparatively efficient producers. The numerous small, comparatively inefficient ones are kept
in business by giving them quotas that would not be justified if the
intention were to produce the total output decided upon at minimum
cost. In the case of oil, hundreds of thousands of low-output wellsthough not all of them by any means are marginal in economic
terms-are completely free of control so long as their output remains below the maximum cut-off point. The cutting back of out-
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put of the lower-cost wells, imposing on them the vastly disproportionate burden of excess capacity, is the way in which price is sustained at its non-competitive level and costs are equated (upward)
to that cartel-sustained price.
This inherent tendency of cartelization to protect the production
of the higher-cost firms has another, also economically irrational,
manifestation in the oil industry. Production allowables vary with
the depth of the producing reservoir; the deeper the reservoir, the
larger the allowable. For example, the 1965 Texas yardstick provides an allowable under 40-acre spacing of 74 barrels a day for
wells of less than 2,000 feet depth, 157 barrels for wells at 9,000
to 9,500 feet and 400 barrels a day at 14,000 to 14,500 feet. This
sounds quite reasonable to people brought up in the medieval tradition of just price. After all, costs of production are much greater
at the greater depths, and producers could not survive, in those
deep wells, with 74 barrel-a-day allowables. But this is only another
way of saying that the higher the cost, the larger the share of the
market a firm should be given. Put that way it does not seem quite
so obvious or just, and in economic terms it is utterly irrational. But
it is another way in which costs are raised to price in this industry,
rather than, as in a competitive market, price reduced to the (marginal) cost of the most efficient firms able to supply the quantities
demanded.
Perhaps we should, before leaving the inefficient allocation of
production quotas, confront the possible response that maintaining
the market price and exempting marginal wells from production
control is required in the interest of conservation. The argument
is that if price fell and/or restrictions were imposed on the marginal
wells they would become uneconomic and close down; and if they
closed down, their oil would be lost forever. To this an economist
can only supply the following answers. First, it is not at all clear
that wells producing ten or fifteen barrels a day are necessarily high
cost and will close down entirely if price is cut or their output regulated. Professor Homan has pointed out that there are 20,000
wells in Pennsylvania producing on the average less than half a barrel a day, and yet they continue to operate. The second, and more
important, answer is that conservation is inevitably an economic
problem, not a purely physical one. If a $3.00 price is desirable because it keeps certain marginal wells in operation, then obviously a
$4.00 price would be even better and a $10.00 price even better
than that. Society must make economic choices. It must compare
the gains from saving some oil from physical loss with the costs in
society's resources of continuing to produce from them. The con-

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VOL. 10

servation decision is an investment decision like any other; it uses
up society's scarce resources. And society cannot avoid deciding
whether it is worth the price. It is highly questionable that we are
making the best provision for the future to invest the additional
resources needed to produce from high-cost wells, when the alternative would be to shut them down and produce our oil from the lowcost wells. We could use the savings, if we wished, to explore for
more oil, or to subsidize experimentation in synthetic fuels, or to build
more schools, whose pupils might one day learn to dispense with oil.
And even this calculation is unnecessary in the case of the deeper
wells. There is no possible benefit in encouraging an earlier exploration and production from greater depth, at the expense of lowercost production at shallower depths. The deeper oil is not going to
disappear, and it makes sense to exploit it only when doing so will
use fewer of society's resources than any alternatives available at
that time.
To return to our main theme: the rise in cost was itself the result
of the excessive investment stimulated by high prices, tax preferences and prorationing. Regarded in this light, the soaring figures
of well completions in the first postwar decade, the billions of dollars the industry invested annually in domestic production, were not
at all a sign of health. They were a sign of the inefficiency of the
industry's governing institutions, which provided an artificial encouragement to the overinvestment that showed up eventually in
higher costs of production.
But artificial restrictions on competition, once imposed, almost
always have a tendency to intensify and to spread. We have already
seen how the production controls had to be drawn tighter and tighter
until around 1963. Sooner or later controls would have to be extended to imports as well. Inflated domestic prices and costs of
production greatly increased the incentive of American companies
to look abroad-American-owned production abroad soared, and
American refiners brought in increasing quantities of foreign oil. So
while the domestic price was being maintained by intensified production cutbacks in 1954, imports increased sharply and so-called
voluntary controls were instituted. When the same thing happened
at the higher price level of 1957-58, while prices abroad were
dropping under the impact of growing supplies in weakening hands,
the pretense of voluntary controls had finally to be dropped, and
mandatory controls instituted. Why were they necessary? Because
U.S. costs were higher. Why were U.S. costs higher? Because the
price was maintained-by production controls and by import quotas.
Import controls were justified also by the argument that they
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were needed to continue the stimulus to domestic exploration. Why
did the number of exploratory wells drilled in the United States
drop 32% between 1956 and 1961? Because of the heavy burden
of excess capacity caused by previous exploration and development,
the sharp cutbacks in production allowables, and the consequently
extended period of time over which explorers could hope to get
their money back. And why had these occurred? Because of all the
stimuli to exploration previously supplied by our tax laws, by production controls and by higher prices.
Oil industry spokesmen typically defend the depletion allowance
by pointing out that their profits after tax are no higher than the
average for all industry. Exactly. They could not possibly be, so
long as the difficulty of entry here is not above-average. But that is
no defense of the allowance. It merely means that it encourages excessive investment in the industry and creates a burden of costly
excess capacity. How much excess? Just enough to offset, in higher
costs, the stimulus to investment that it provides.
To summarize: price, production control and the depletion allowance determine the equilibrium level of excess capacity in the industry; that is to say, they determine the equilibrium level of cost.
In light of these considerations, it seems to me the current cry
in the industry for higher prices, further cutbacks in imports and
a higher depletion allowance are steps in precisely the wrong direction. They will, in the end, all of them, produce higher costs.
Not only is the temporary benefit that they will confer unjustified, in
view of the fact that profits in the oil industry seem very satisfactory, it will not even be in the interest of the industry itself.
Interfuel competition has intensified enormously in the last decade. Of the new homes constructed in 1966, 51 % were equipped for
heating with gas, 27% with electricity and only 22% with oil.
True, oil is still free of effective competition in the transportation
market. But synthesis of hydrocarbons from coal seems to be close
to commercial feasibility-notice how many oil companies have
begun to buy coal properties-and so is exploitation of the Athabasca tar sands. For the oil industry to seek a solution for any
present difficulties by trying to crank up another spin of the wheel
of the early 1950's is likely to be self-defeating from its standpoint,
and much worse than that for the American consumer and economy.

